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INTRODUCTION
On June 5, 2002, Foday Sankoh, the Sierra Leonean ex-leader of
the rebel force Revolutionary United Front ("R.U.F."), stood in front
of Sierra Leone's High Court to face charges for atrocities that he
ordered and committed during the ten year civil war in Sierra Leone.I
One of Sankoh's three children, Mbalu Sankoh, wept openly and
cried "Daddy, Daddy" as Sankoh passed her at the hearing.' Mbalu's
words and presence created an unsettling image because of the
R.U.F.'s notorious use of child soldiers, some younger than Mbalu,
to murder, rape, and maim innocent civilians. 3
I. See Sankoh Rejects Sierra Leone Elections, BBC NEWS, June 5, 2002
(reporting that Sankoh will be tried with forty-nine other R.U.F. rebels for the
deaths of twenty-two peace protesters in the May 8, 2000 shooting outside his
home in Freetown), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_2027000/2027524.stm (last
visited Nov. 2, 2002); see also Sierra Leone News Archives, SIERRA LEONE WEB,
May 29, 2002 (explaining that at his hearing, Sankoh faced a seventy-count
indictment for murder and other related charges in connection with the shooting of
protestors demonstrating in front of Sankoh's Freetown residence in May 2000), at
http://www.sierra-leone.org/slnewsO5O2.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2002);
Background to Sierra Leone Civil War, FREE SPEECH [hereinafter Background to
Civil War] (identifying Foday Sankoh as a former corporal in the national army of
Sierra Leone who was jailed for seven years for planning to overthrow the
government in 1971), at http://free.freespeech.org/isierra-
leone/civilwar/background.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2002).
2. See Todd Pitman, Ex-Sierra Leone Rebel Head on Trial, WASH. POST, June
5, 2002, at Al (describing Mbalu Sankoh's reaction at her father's hearing).
3. See Norimitsu Onishi, Children of War in Sierra Leone Try to Start Over,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2002, at A14 (recounting the experience of a child soldier who
fought alongside the R.U.F. when the rebel group attacked Freetown, the capitol of
Sierra Leone, killing, raping, and maiming thousands of civilians), available at
http://www.crin.org/resources/infodetail.asp?ID=2595&flag='news'Resources/Ne
ws/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2002); COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS,
GLOBAL REPORT 2001 (2001) [hereinafter GLOBAL REPORT] (listing Sierra Leone
as one of the Sub-Saharan countries most affected by the problem of children
soldiers), at http://www.globalmarch.org/virtuallibrary/childsoldiers-global-
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Sankoh's children are not alone in watching to see whether
Sankoh will be held accountable for his actions.4 In fact, thousands
of children, both boys and girls, whose playtime became a nightmare
of AK-47's, sexual exploitation, and horrific violence 5 will look on
to see if justice will be done or if Sankoh's trial is, as he himself has
asserted, "just another game."6
report/global-report-contents.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2002); Press Release,
Amnesty International, Sierra Leone: Action needed to end use of child combatants
(Aug. 31, 2000) [hereinafter Amnesty Press Release] (noting that more than 5,000
children under the age of eighteen have fought in Sierra Leone's internal armed
conflict), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/AFR510752000?OpenDocument&of =
COUNTRIES\SIERRA+LEONE (last visited Nov. 2, 2002). Cf AMNESTY INT'L,
SIERRA LEONE: ENDING IMPUNITY - AN OPPORTUNITY NOT TO BE MISSED, 2
(2000) [hereinafter ENDING IMPUNITY] (citing arbitrary killings, mutilations, rapes,
and abductions as some of the human rights abuses attributed to the R.U.F.);
Ismene Zarifis, Sierra Leone's Search for Justice and Accountability of Child
Soldiers, 9 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 18, 19 (2002) (explaining that after children were
forcibly recruited in Sierra Leone, they were drugged and indoctrinated into the
systematic killing, raping, and maiming of innocent victims).
4. See Hearing on U.S. Ratification of the Optional Protocols to the
Convention of the Rights of the Child Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm.,
107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Becker Hearings] (testimony of Jo Becker,
Advocacy Director, Children's Rights Division, Human Rights Division Human
Rights Watch) (discussing the plight of child soldiers in more than thirty different
world conflicts), available at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/03/childsoldiersO307.htm (last visited Nov. 2,
2002).
5. See ENDING IMPUNITY, supra note 3, at 7 (documenting former child
soldiers' testimony regarding the universal recruitment of child soldiers); see also
Becker Hearings, supra note 4 (recounting the experience of a Sierra Leonean
child soldier Ishmael Beah). Beah stated:
I vividly remember the very first day that I was in combat .... I was recruited
with the kids that were eight years old, nine years old. They were so small
some of them couldn't even carry the AK-47's that were given to us so they
had to drag it. I was in an ambush and bullets were flying back and forth,
people were shooting. I didn't want to pull the trigger at all but when you
watch kids.., being shot and killed and ... dying and crying and their blood
was spilling all over your face you just moved beyond, something just pushed
you and you start pulling the trigger.
Id.
6. See Sankoh Rejects Sierra Leone Elections, supra note 1 (quoting Sankoh
describing himself as "the inner God" and asserting that the trial was part of the
"same old game"); see also Nicole Fritz & Alison Smith, Current Apathy for
Coming Anarchy: Building the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 25 FORDHAM INT'L
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The use of children in armed conflict is not unique to Sierra Leone
or to Foday Sankoh.7 Human rights organizations and humanitarian
groups report that girls and boys under the age of fifteen, some as
young as five, have fought or are fighting in thirty-seven of the
world's fifty-five ongoing or recently concluded conflicts.8
Moreover, at any given time, commanders around the world are
employing more than 300,000 children under the age of eighteen in
armed conflict.9 Thus, the tragedy surrounding the use of child
soldiers in Sierra Leone is not an isolated incident.'0 Rather, it
mirrors what in some war-ravaged areas of the world might be more
accurately described as the norm. I
Furthermore, in parts of the world where children's suffering at
the hands of armed groups is likely to be the greatest, accountability
L.J. 391, 391 (2001) (highlighting the absolute horror of the R.U.F.'s signature
amputations and commenting that the soldiers in the Sierra Leonean conflict
seemed to be the cruelest of combatants).
7. See Cris R. Revaz, The Optional Protocols to the U.N. Convention on the
Rights of the Child on Sex Trafficking and Child Soldiers, 9 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 13,
15 (2001) (stating that The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers reports that
armed groups in more than eighty-five countries employ children as soldiers in
armed conflict).
8. See Children at War, NEWSWEEK WEB EXCLUSIVE, May 4, 2002
(explaining that from Africa to Asia to Latin America, children are fighting in wars
and rebellions and are serving as sex slaves, servants and spies), at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/747688.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2002); see also
AMNESTY INT'L, SIERRA LEONE: CHILDHOOD - A CASUALTY OF CONFLICT
[hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L] (2000) (reporting that in Sierra Leone more than
5,000 children under the age of eighteen, some as young as five years old, have
fought in combat); GLOBAL REPORT, supra note 3 (noting that approximately
300,000 children are engaged in military conflict in more than eighty-five
countries); Revaz, supra note 7, at 15 (stating that in addition to the approximately
300,000 children engaged in armed conflict throughout the world, another 500,000
are recruited into paramilitary organizations, guerilla groups, and civil militias).
9. See GLOBAL REPORT, supra note 3 (discussing why military recruitment of
children under the age of eighteen should be prohibited).
10. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (detailing the widespread use
of child soldiers in more than eighty-five countries).
11. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 8, at 4-9 (describing how all four armed
groups participating in the civil war in Sierra Leone used child soldiers).
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is often the most difficult to attain.12 Indeed, in countries like Sierra
Leone, where the rule of law is often overrun by protracted conflicts,
the challenges of holding perpetrators accountable for recruiting
minors are substantial.13 As a result, decimated national legal
systems, an inability to adequately fund judicial processes, and the
immediate need for political stability and nation-building often
compromise the search for justice in these states. ' 4
This Comment addresses the complex issues of accountability
involved in bringing to justice those individuals, like Foday Sankoh,
responsible for the recruitment of children into armed conflict in
Sierra Leone.' 5 Through an examination of the proposed Special
Court ("Court") in Sierra Leone, this Comment argues that
international efforts to hold perpetrators accountable for the
recruitment of child soldiers in Sierra Leone have failed to account
for the social, political, and economic realities present in war-torn
12. See infra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the inherent obstacles
to holding perpetrators accountable in states where prolonged conflict has
debilitated and de-legitimized the judicial system).
13. See infra notes 105-109 and accompanying text (discussing the dire state of
the national judicial system at the end of the civil war in Sierra Leone). See
generally The Promises of International Prosecution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1957
(2001) (critiquing generally the ability of international criminal tribunals to bring
justice to war-torn states); AMNESTY INT'L U.K., IN THE FIRING LINE - WAR AND
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 61 (1999) [hereinafter FIRING LINE] (explaining that minors
often are recruited when the number of adult soldiers is insufficient for the force
needed because the conflicts have been so prolonged and so many have already
died). As internal armed conflicts continue, therefore, armed forces begin to recruit
younger and younger individuals so that they may meet their manpower needs and
so that they may deprive the enemy of potential recruits. Id.
14. See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity. Can International Criminal
Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 30-31 (2001) (arguing
that despite obstacles in implementing methods of international criminal justice,
there are many positive results from criminal prosecution and accountability).
These results are imperative in the post-war peace building process. Id. See
generally Gwen K. Young, Amnesty and Accountability, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
427, 433-41 (2002) (discussing how the need for immediate political leadership
often compromises any search for accountability in war-ravaged states where
judicial systems have been decimated by conflict).
15. See infra Part III (discussing the challenges of successfully prosecuting
those responsible for the recruitment of child soldiers in Sierra Leone).
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states such as Sierra Leone, where children are most likely to engage
in armed conflict.'6
Part I introduces the current plight of child soldiers throughout the
world, and, specifically, in Sierra Leone. 7 This section outlines the
last decade of conflict in Sierra Leone and describes the creation of
the Special Court of Sierra Leone.' 8 Part II analyzes the potential of
Sierra Leone's Special Court to bring perpetrators to justice. 9
Finally, Part III proposes recommendations to the Government of
Sierra Leone, the United Nations, and the international community
for ending impunity by holding accountable those who recruit
children into combat.2 °
I. BACKGROUND
In the past century the face of warfare has changed drastically,
making it exceedingly difficult to distinguish between civilian and
soldier on the one hand, and child and adult on the other.2' Wars are
no longer confined to definitive battlefields, but occur more often in
populated areas where recruiters can easily take children from
villages, roadsides, buses, schools, markets, and churches.22 U.N.
16. See infra Part III (revealing the inadequacies of the Statute of the Special
Court as a result of the international community's and the United Nations' failure
to consider the specific circumstances in Sierra Leone).
17. See infra Part I (describing the recruitment and treatment of child soldiers
in Sierra Leone and throughout the world).
18. See id. (providing background information on children's participation in
armed conflict throughout the world, the civil war in Sierra Leone, and the
establishment of the Special Court of Sierra Leone).
19. See infra Part II (arguing that the Special Court's jurisdictional and
budgetary limitations render it inadequate to bring to justice those responsible for
the recruitment of child soldiers).
20. See infra Part Ill (proposing steps that the United Nations, the international
community, and the Government of Sierra Leone should take so that the Special
Court is effective in holding individuals accountable for the recruitment of child
soldiers).
21. See Onishi, supra note .3, at A14 (illustrating how the unconventional wars
in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Congo, and Sudan have blurred the distinctions between
adults and children in combat situations).
22. See Amy Beth Abbott, Note, Child Soldiers - The Use of Children as
Instruments of War, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 499, 509 (2000) (suggesting
that wars have moved from well-defined battlefields to populated areas such as
[18:537
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figures indicate that around the turn of the century, five percent of all
war casualties were civilian. 3 That number climbed to sixty-five
percent during World War 1124 and has jumped to ninety percent in
recent wars.25
Of these civilian casualties, over forty percent are children.26
Indeed, the rising number of child casualties illuminates the global
problem of the invasion of conflict into children's lives 7.2 However, a
more specific problem exists where children find themselves not
only in war's path, but actively participating in war.28 Clearly,
recruitment of children into armed conflict is the extreme example of
children living in the line of fire. 9
There are several explanations as to why children are increasingly
participating as combatants in armed conflicts.30 First, technological
villages); see also Mike Barber, Child Soldiers a Growing Concern on Foreign
Battlefields, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 8, 2002 (asserting that conflicts
today, in contrast to the Cold War, are driven by non-state actors rather than
political ideologies), available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/65670_childsoldiers08.shtml (last visited
Nov. 2, 2002). Because many of these armed groups are fueled by poverty and
hopelessness, these wars are especially conducive to the use of child combatants.
Id.; see also Becker Hearings, supra note 4 (explaining that in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, thousands of children have been recruited into the war as a
result of abductions from homes, roadsides, and markets).
23. See Women and Children Bear Brunt of War, SAIGON TIMES DAILY, May
3, 2002, available at 2002 WL 3335988 (considering historical statistics for
civilian casualties during war). In the last decade, more than two million children
have been killed in wars and more than twelve million have been orphaned. Id.
24. See id. (discussing historical statistics for civilian casualties during war).
25. See id. (noting the rise in the number of civilian casualties).
26. See FIRING LINE, supra note 13, at 16 (explaining that one reason for the
high number of child casualties is that wars often take place in poorer developing
countries where children under the age of eighteen constitute nearly one-half of the
population).
27. Id. (linking the rise in the number of child casualties to changes in the
nature of warfare).
28. Id. at 17 (explaining that "holding a gun, firing it, and seeing a person drop
down has become the only reality" that children know).
29. Id. (illustrating the trauma experienced by children in armed conflict).
30. See generally Steven Hick, The Political Economy of War-Affected
Children, 575 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 106, 110-20 (explaining the
increased use of children as soldiers in armed conflict). Poverty, according to Hick,
is the greatest reason for the use of children in warfare. Id. Hick argues that the
exploitation of resources by transnational corporations serves to heighten poverty
2002] 543
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developments have produced automatic weapons and lightweight
arms that are affordable and accessible, thereby making it easier for
governmental and insurgent groups to arm children.3' Second,
extreme poverty continues to grip major portions of the world,
forcing children into powerless situations where volunteering to fight
may be their only chance for survival.32
Finally, since the Cold War, the world's conflicts have become
more internalized. 3  During these localized conflicts between armed
civilians or ethnic factions, opposing sides do not distinguish
between children and adults.34 For instance, where ethnicity is the
ultimate cause of the conflict, opposition groups foster hatred for
levels, leading to civil unrest and, ultimately, the recruitment of children for armed
conflict. Id. The increase in income inequality among countries and the sale of
weapons to poor countries also contribute to the rising number of children who
participate in armed conflict. Id. Hick believes the best way to protect children
from wars is to stop wars from happening by promoting equitable development,
reducing the wealth gap among countries and within countries, and stopping the
proliferation of weapons sales from developed to developing countries. Id. at 144.
31. See Abbott, supra note 22, at 509 (explaining that the proliferation of
automatic weapons has increased the desirability and utility of child soldiers); see
also Barber, supra note 22 (describing how a child can operate and learn to care
for an AK-47 assault rifle in less than an hour); Amnesty Press Release, supra note
3 (articulating how traffic in small arms and light weapons encourages the use of
child combatants). Children who have been abducted and recruited by rebel forces
in Sierra Leone have received arms and ammunition from illegal arms distribution.
Id.; Hick, supra note 30, at 114 (stating that assault rifles such as the AK-47 and
M-16 are lightweight and simple to use). The availability of these weapons has
steadily increased in war zones and over fifty-five million AK-47s have been sold
since 1947. Id. The weapons are also inexpensive, as evidenced by the fact that in
one African country the rifles are sold for only six U.S. dollars. Id.
32. See Hick, supra note 30, at 114 (noting that many children in Cambodia
joined armed groups in the 1980s to secure food and protection). In 1990, children
as young as seven entered combat in Liberia because, according to the director of
the Liberian Red Cross, "those with guns could survive."); see also infra notes 39-
41 and accompanying text (explaining that joining armed forces might be the only
way that children can avoid starvation when their families cannot adequately
provide for them).
33. See Abbott, supra note 22, at 508 (examining the transformation in the
nature and methods of warfare as conflicts become products of nationalist, ethnic,
and religious dissention). As a result of this transformation of warfare, it has
become more difficult to protect children from human rights abuses during
conflict. Id.
34. See id. at 523 (positing that in conflicts between armed civilians or ethnic
factions, hatred exists for both children and adults).
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their enemies regardless of age. 5 These factors have led not only to
rising numbers of child casualties, but also to the increasing use of
children as instruments of war.36
A. PLAYING WAR: THE CHANGE FROM CHILD TO COMBATANT
Whether armed groups forcibly recruit children or the children
themselves volunteer, the same groups of children are most likely to
become child soldiers.37 These groups include the most vulnerable
and disadvantaged children-those without traditional families to
protect them, those with little or no education, and those from
marginalized sectors of society.38 Because these children are
deprived of the security provided by traditional familial structures
and economic wealth, they are usually the first children recruited into
35. See id. (stating that in conflicts between groups within the same country,
ethnic factions hate both children and adults of the opposition); see, e.g., AMNESTY
INT'L, supra note 8, at 8 (demonstrating how the R.U.F. failed to differentiate
between children and adults in their mass killings).
36. See Abbott, supra note 22, at 499 (coining the term "instruments of war" to
describe child soldiers).
37. See FIRING LINE, supra note 13, at 58 (describing the groups of children
most likely to become child soldiers).
38. See THE INT'L SAVE THE CHILDREN ALLIANCE, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS:
REALITY OR RHETORIC? THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: THE
FIRST TEN YEARS 46 (Sarah Muscroft ed., 2000) [hereinafter SAVE THE CHILDREN]
(outlining the types of children most vulnerable to be recruited to be child
soldiers); see also FIRING LINE, supra note 13, at 58 (highlighting that orphans and
refugees are more likely than middle or upper class children to become child
soldiers). The first group includes children who are separated from their families,
are without families, or who have disrupted family backgrounds. Id. Orphans,
refugees and displaced children, children on the street, children of single-parent
families, and step-children fall into this group. Id. Children with little or no
education or with no access to education make up a second group of children likely
to be recruited as child soldiers. Id. Lastly, children from the most marginalized
sectors of society and the lowest socio-economic groups and children from war
zones repeatedly become child soldiers. Id. See generally Megan E. Kures, Note,
The Effect of Armed Conflict on Children: The Plight of Unaccompanied Refugee
Minors, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 141, 141-63 (2001) (analyzing the
problem of unaccompanied refugee minors both historically and today). Because
unaccompanied refugee minors have lost one or both of their parents, they are
especially at risk for neglect, violence, military recruitment, sexual exploitation,
and other abuses. Id. at 144.
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armed groups.39 For these children, the lack of alternative means to
fulfill basic needs such as food and shelter is likely to lead to their
participation in armed conflict. 40 Accordingly, any "choice" these
children have as to whether or not to enlist is illusory.
In many conflicts, such as the civil war in Sierra Leone, armed
groups recruit both boys and girls as child soldiers. 2 Although armed
forces expect child soldiers to perform the same duties regardless of
their sex, girls face gender-specific abuses such as sexual
exploitation.43 In Sierra Leone, armed forces often abducted girls,
39. See FIRING LINE, supra note 13, at 58 (concluding that armed groups often
find these children easy targets for recruitment' because participation in armed
conflict gives these children a sense of belonging and importance).
40. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WAR WITHOUT QUARTER chap. VI (1998)
(explaining that "[t]here are areas where children beg insistently to join the
guerillas, but there are also situations in which their very own mothers, who are
desperate, take their children to the guerillas because their -families live in
misery."), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/colombia/Colom989-
06.htm#P 1873_455945 (last visited Nov. 2, 2002).
41. See Abbott, supra note 22, at 517-19 (arguing that any "choice" children
have to enlist in the armed forces is non-existent); see also Becker Hearings, supra
note 4 (explaining how a society breaks down during conflict and often children
are driven from their homes and separated from their families). Consequently,
children begin to view armed groups as their best chance for survival. Id.
42. See GRACA MACHEL, THE IMPACT OF WAR ON CHILDREN: A REVIEW OF
PROCESS SINCE THE 1996 UNITED NATIONS REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF ARMED
CONFLICT ON CHILDREN 13 (2001) (stating that both boys and girls participate in
conflict in many states). In the Philippines, for instance, the Moro Islamic
Liberation Fronts teaches girls from ten to sixteen years old how to fire M-16
Armalite rifles. Id.; see also AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 8, at I (citing the
participation of girls in armed conflict in Sierra Leone and quoting Resolution
1314 (2000) on Children of Armed Conflict of 11 August 2000). Resolution 1314
emphasized:
[t]he importance of giving consideration to the special needs and particular
vulnerabilities of girls affected by armed conflict, including, inter alia, those
heading households, orphaned, sexually exploited and used as combatants
[and determined] that their [girls'] human rights, protection and welfare be
incorporated in the development of policies and programs, including those of
prevention, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.
Id. at 13; see also SAVE THE CHILDREN, supra note 38, at 53 (stating that where
girls are recruited, they assume almost identical positions as soldiers as the boys
and the girls constitute about one-third of the total number of child soldiers).
43. See Violence Against Women Rife During Sierra Leonean War, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 20, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2366996 (quoting Radhika
Coomaraswamy, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, who
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forcing them to become "wives" or concubines.44 As a result,
international organizations report that women and girls suffered the
greatest at the hands of armed groups during Sierra Leone's
conflict.45
stated that "systematic and widespread rape and other sexual violence has been a
hallmark of the conflict in Sierra Leone"). A U.N. report implicated every faction
involved in the conflict for violations such as rape, sexual slavery, and forced
marriages. Id.; see also Sexual Violence Within the Sierra Leone Conflict, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH REPORT 2001: SIERRA LEONE (Human Rights Watch, New York,
N.Y.), February 26, 2001 [hereinafter Sexual Violence] (reporting that victims of
sexual violence in Sierra Leone explain that the violence is often premeditated and
organized, suggesting responsibility on the part of the military), at
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/sl-bck0226.htm (last visited Nov. 2,
2002). The report documents that boys as well as girls have been subject to sexual
violence at the hands of the military. Id.
44. See SAVE THE CHILDREN, supra note 38, at 53-54 (describing how girls
have no control over the outcome of this sexual exploitation and may become
impregnated and forced to have an abortion or abandon the child); see also Sexual
Violence, supra note 43 (revealing cases where fathers were forced to watch the
rape of their daughters, middle aged women were raped by boys as young as
eleven, women were raped in public places, and girls were raped during sacred
coming of age rituals); Becker Hearings, supra note 4 (recounting in Uganda the
Lord's Resistance Army abducted more than 10,000 children, including girls
forced to serve as "wives" for rebel commanders); Press Release, UNICEF,
UNICEF Calls for Eradication of Commercial Sexual Exploitation: New Report
Says Millions of Children are Sexually Exploited (Dec. 12, 2001) (explaining that
armed conflict creates special risks of sexual violence and exploitation for children
and refugees at the hands of camp officials, border guards, police officers, and
military personnel), available at http://www.unicef.org/newsline/0lpr97.htm (last
visited Nov. 2, 2002); MACHEL, supra note 42, at 13 (noting that the majority of
girls forced into military roles become infected with sexually transmitted diseases).
In some armed groups once a leader dies, the girl is given a ritual cleaning and
then passed on to another leader. Id.
45. See SAVE THE CHILDREN, supra note 38, at 54 (asserting that in some
countries girls are eager to join armed conflicts as a means of escaping from
traditional constraints on the freedoms and status of women); see also Barber,
supra note 22 (reporting that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelaam in Sri Lanka
have organized thousands of children into a "baby brigade" consisting only of
combatants younger than sixteen). Approximately half of the Baby Brigade
members are girls and some of them are as young as ten. Id. They have been
chosen to be suicide bombers because they are less likely to be thoroughly
searched at security checkpoints. Id. Teenage girls are often recruited to become
suicide bombers since it is easy for them to hide explosives around the waist. SAVE
THE CHILDREN, supra note 38, at 54.
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1. Recruitment of Child Soldiers
While different armed groups employ various recruitment
methods, statistics show that many armed groups recruit children by
force.46 Armed groups use force to take children from schools, public
spaces, and even their own homes. 7 During these abductions, armed
groups may compel children to follow orders by threatening death, or
by forcing the children to commit atrocities against family members
and friends so that they become hardened to violence.48
Reports by international organizations indicate that inefficiency,
corruption, and structural inadequacies often offset the legal
safeguards established by states to prohibit the use of children in
armed conflict.49 As a result, forced recruitment occurs even in states
where legislation is in place to prohibit compulsory military service
before the age of eighteen. 0 The non-existence of identification
papers stating an individual's name and age, for instance, often
facilitates the recruitment of minors.5 In these situations, even if
46. See FIRING LINE, supra note 13, at 59 (reporting that many armies resort to
random, forcible seizures in public places to recruit children). Young men who
appear to be close to military age are taken without being given a chance to prove
whether or not they are of age. Id.; see also Abbott, supra note 22, at 512-13
(providing examples of direct and indirect recruitment of child soldiers).
47. See FIRING LINE, supra note 13, at 59 (explaining that random sweeps are
made to recruit children most often in public places, but sometimes the armed
groups even conduct sweeps from house to house).
48. See id. at 63 (reporting that armed groups often force recruited children to
take part in gruesome initiation ceremonies). Groups may force children to commit
atrocities against people they know in order to harden them to violence. Id. The
leaders of these groups may brutalize children to teach them respect for authority.
Id.
49. See SAVE THE CHILDREN, supra note 38, at 54 (explaining that lack of
universal identification papers indicating a child's age often thwart legislative
attempts to regulate the age of soldiers).
50. See FIRING LINE, supra note 13, at 59 (noting that "inefficiency, corruption
or structural inadequacies" inhibit the effectiveness of legislation setting an age
limit of eighteen for participation in armed conflict).
51. See Donald G. McNeil Jr., In Angola, Soldiers Aren't Recruited, They're
Kidnapped as Decades-old War Flares Anew, Forced Conscription Becomes Real
Fear, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 31, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7656443
(indicating that even with identification papers soldiers may still recruit children);
see also MACHEL, supra note 42, at 9 (stating that worldwide, one-third of all
births, which amounts to about forty million children, go unregistered every year).
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minimum age requirements are in place, without identification
papers recruiters may evade the law 2.5 Consequently, as evidenced by
the abuses committed in Sierra Leone, forced recruitment often
becomes systematic due to the lack of serious legal ramifications
armed groups face. 3
Forced recruitment, however, is not the only way in which
children end up on the front lines.54 In countries like Sierra Leone,
where children have been raised in war zones, a variety of factors
may cause children to volunteer for service in armed groups.5 5 The
physical, mental, and emotional toll of growing up in a culture of
violence, the need for security, the desperation for food, and the
desire to avenge the deaths of family members and friends, all drive
In some cases, children themselves do not know their ages and recruiters will guess
and record a child's age as eighteen in order to produce the appearance of legal
compliance. Id.
52. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (suggesting that without the
distribution of accurate identification papers, recruiters may ignore legislative
policies establishing minimum age requirements for participation in armed
conflict); see also FIRING LINE, supra note 13, at 59 (explaining that the lack of
age documentation deprives parents of the opportunity to prove the child's
ineligibility for military service). Because of these procedural inadequacies, many
governmental and armed opposition groups easily implement forms of conscription
and abduction without any threat of legal consequences. Id. at 59-61.
53. See Becker Hearings, supra note 4 (providing examples of countries, such
as Uganda and Afghanistan, that have implemented systematic methods of child
recruitment). The Ugandan rebel group, the Lord's Resistance Army, has abducted
more than 10,000 children from Northern Uganda over the last decade. Id. In
Columbia, there are up to 10,000 members of guerilla forces under the age of
eighteen. Id. Similarly, two generations of children have been subject to
recruitment in Afghanistan. Id. The resistance forces to the Soviet invasion and
later warring factions recruited the first group. Id. In the most recent conflict with
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance recruited Afghani
children as young as eleven. Id.; see also Barber, supra note 22 (discussing the
need for the military to address the issue of child soldiers). In April 2002, the
United States witnessed the tragic consequences of this long-standing policy of
child recruitment when a fourteen-year-old boy used an assault rifle to kill Fort
Lewis Green Beret Sergeant Nathan Chapman. Id. Sergeant Chapman was the first
U.S. fighting casualty of the conflict in Afghanistan. Id.
54. See FIRING LINE, supra note 13, at 60 (explaining that many children join
armed forces without being forced to do so).
55. See, e.g., id. (describing how children's choice to join armed forces is a
simple case of survival because the recruiting soldiers provide guns-a means of
getting food-for children who would otherwise starve).
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children toward participating in armed conflicts. 6 Because children
and their families are unable to find ways to fulfill their basic needs,
desperation, rather than military zeal, most often pushes children to
become soldiers. 7
Furthermore, children seldom have the understanding to make
informed choices about participating in armed conflict.58 Recruiters
do not always give children or their parents the necessary
information to determine what service in the governmental or rebel
armed forces will entail. 9 As a result, children often enter the armed
services unaware of what commanders will expect of them and
56. See Abbott, supra note 22, at 516-17 (insinuating that any "choice"
children have in enlisting in the armed forces is non-existent, since children do not
have the capacity to act in their own best interests); FIRING LINE, supra note 13, at
60-61 (explaining the factors that may lure children to armed conflict, including
survival, prestige, social conditioning, and revenge). The book argues that
children's negative experiences with governmental armed forces constitutes the
most predominant factor in children's decisions to volunteer to fight for opposition
groups. Id. at 61; see also Becker Hearings, supra note 4 (explaining how a society
breaks down during war and that often, children are separated from their homes
and families). Consequently, children begin to view armed groups as their best
chance for survival. Id.
57. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 40 ("There are areas where
children beg insistently to join the guerillas, but there are also situations in which
their very own mothers, who are desperate, take their children to the guerillas
because their families live in misery."); see also FIRING LINE, supra note 13, at 60
(pointing out that armed groups may provide shelter, protection and a surrogate
family for children who may have been orphaned or separated from their families
during conflict).
58. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 40 (stating that a public advocate
has explained that guerilla groups appeal to children by promising adventure and
financial security for their parents).
59. See Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, United Kingdom: U-18s: Child Soldiers
at Risk (July 11, 2000) (stating that the information given to recruited individuals
in the U.K. as to their participation in the armed forces is often difficult to
understand and incomplete), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/print/EUR450582000?OpenDocument (last visited
Nov. 2, 2002). The "Notice Paper," for instance, which sets out the terms and
conditions of service, does not make clear that a soldier under age eighteen could
be deployed in armed conflict. Id.
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unable to grasp the gravity of the consequences of participation in
armed conflict.6"
Cultural values and ideology may also play a significant role in an
armed group's recruitment by inducing children to enlist.61 In Sierra
Leone, parents permitted children as young as twelve ;years old to
fight for the Civil Defense Forces ("C.D.F."), the civilian militia
based on traditional hunters, because of the elevated social status
associated with membership in groups of traditional hunters.62
Former child soldiers have explained that fighting for these armed
groups meant that they belonged to what many in their region
considered to be "the supremacy of society."63
Some children receive military indoctrination in school programs,
through the integration of military life into the general curricula.64
Because of their young age, however, children cannot differentiate
between competing ideologies or fully appreciate the implications of
60. See Abbott, supra note 22, at 515-18 (noting the disastrous physical,
emotional, and sexual consequences that children suffer as a result of military
service).
61. See FIRING LINE, supra note 13, at 60 (including ideology as one of the
reasons children volunteer to participate in armed conflict); see also MACHEL,
supra note 42, at 11 (proclaiming that children are often responding to economic,
cultural, social, and political pressures when they volunteer for armed conflicf, as
opposed to exercising their own free will).
62. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 8, at 9 (reporting that when
Mohamed, a twelve year old from the Port Loko District of Sierra Leone, was
recruited by the C.D.F., his parents did nothing to prevent it because of the status
associated with the hunters). The C.D.F. is a civilian militia based on societies of
traditional hunters that supported the government of President Kabbah. Id. at 3.
•63. See id. at 9 (quoting one C.D.F. child soldier).
64. See Press Release, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Children
Invisible Soldiers in the Middle East and North Africa (April 7, 2001)
(summarizing a report discussing the infiltration of military indoctrination in
children's schooling), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/MDE010032001 ?OpenDocument&o=THEM
ES (last visited Nov. 2, 2002). In Iraq, food rations and school examinations have
been withheld from Iraqi youths who refuse to join "Saddam's Youth." Id. Further,
Iranian boys are reportedly indoctrinated to participate in combat by being given
"keys to paradise" and promises that they will go directly to heaven if they die as
martyrs against the Iraqi enemy. Id.
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their decisions and actions.65 Often, societal pressure forms the basis
for the children's actions, rather than their own decision-making.66
Therefore, participation in armed conflict becomes more of a duty
than a choice for many children.6 7
2. TREATMENT OF CHILD SOLDIERS
Fighting groups generally treat child soldiers the same as adult
recruits and do not afford them special treatment because of their
young age.68 Child soldiers in Sierra Leone during the civil war
experienced the usual beatings, punishments, forced marches
carrying heavy loads, exposure to malnutrition and disease, and
separation from their families.69 In some cases, however, child
soldiers suffered additional exploitive abuse because of their age. 70
For example, armed groups in Sierra Leone often forced the child
soldiers to undertake more dangerous missions because they viewed
the children as "dispensable" or "expendable" because of their
youth.71
65. See Abbott, supra note 22, at 518 (noting that young children cannot
independently form opinions or differentiate competing ideologies).
66. See MACHEL, supra note 42, at 11 (questioning a child's ability to act free
from ideological, economic, and cultural constraints).
67. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (analyzing the factors that
tend to negate a child's ability to exhibit free will when deciding whether to enter
armed conflict).
68. See SAVE THE CHILDREN, supra note 38, at 49-50 (explaining that soldiers
are treated alike regardless of age). Usually, the training and exercises are
structured to break the will of the recruits and to make them subservient to their
superiors. Id.; see also Becker Hearings, supra note 4 (explaining that children
often begin as porters, cooks, or messengers, but eventually fight in combat).
69. See SAVE THE CHILDREN, supra note 38, at 45 (noting that thousands of
children have been fighting in Sierra Leone). In armed opposition groups, new
recruits are sometimes required to kill other children or family members as a form
of initiation. Id. at 50.
70. See Becker Hearings, supra note 4 (explaining that armed groups often
believe children are less important or useful than adult soldiers).
71. See id. (describing how in Colombia, guerillas use children to "collect
intelligence, make and deploy mines, and serve as advance troops in ambush
attacks, while paramilitaries force families to provide children for service or risk
being killed as suspected guerilla sympathizers"). In Rwanda, adult troop leaders
forced unarmed children into battle as decoys and ordered them to make noise by
beating on trees with sticks so that government fire would be diverted away from
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In addition, armed groups often view children as possessing
special attributes for high-risk functions.7 2 In Sierra Leone, the
R.U.F. exploited natural teenage recklessness by drugging teenage
boys and sending them into battle.73 Commanders forced the children
to take drugs before entering battle so that they would feel invincible
and unafraid.74 These policies, coupled with child soldiers'
inexperience and lack of training, contribute to a much greater risk of
death for child soldiers than adult soldiers.75 Likewise, because of
children's underdeveloped bodies and minds, child soldiers find
the more experienced adult troops. Id.; see also Children at War, supra note 8
("They can be cheap, expendable and easier to condition into fearless killing and
unthinking obedience.").
72. See Becker Hearings, supra note 4 (discussing how children are often
forced into the most hazardous roles, such as entering minefields before older
troops or being sent on suicide missions); see also AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 8,
at 3 (explaining that armed groups consider children particularly useful because of
their size and agility).
73. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 8, at 4 (quoting a former child combatant,
now age sixteen saying, "[a]fter sniffing cocaine, I was not afraid of anything. I
became bloody."); see also SAVE THE CHILDREN, supra note 38, at 50 (noting that
this abuse is often deliberately targeted at children because of their vulnerability);
Matthew Price, Sierra Leone: The Battle for Childhood, BBC NEWS ONLINE
(recounting how one Sierra Leonean boy had a scar deep into his forehead from
where the rebels often used a machete to cut into his skull), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/africa/1136430.stm (last visited Nov. 2, 2002).
The rebels would fill the wound with drugs and tape it up again. Id.; see also Tom
Masland, Voices of the Children: 'We Beat and Killed People...', NEWSWEEK,
May 13, 2002 (interviewing four Sierra Leonean boys who all spoke about the
drug factor while they were child soldiers), available at 2002 WL 7294190. One
boy recounted that the boys continually smoked marijuana, and another told of
how the commanders would cut his left pectoral and insert heroin. Id. A third boy
showed where he had been given injections and stated that this had happened more
than twenty-five times before going into battle. Id.
74. See SAVE THE CHILDREN, supra note 38, at 50 (noting that child soldiers
are often provided with drugs and alcohol to reinforce natural teenage
recklessness); see also Masland, supra note 73 (recounting a Sierra Leonean child
soldier's story of when military commanders would cut open his head and insert
cocaine before they sent the child into battle); Amnesty Press Release, supra note 3
(reporting that the U.N. High Commission for Refugees asserted that cocaine-
induced children were extremely vicious). One Sierra Leonean child soldier, now
age fourteen, recounted that taking drugs rendered him unafraid of battle and that
refusal to take drugs could have resulted in death at the hands of his superiors. Id.
75. See FIRING LINE, supra note 13, at 66 (attributing higher casualty rates to
children because of their lack of experience and training).
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themselves more susceptible to particular mental and physical
conditions as a result of participation in armed conflict. 76
Accordingly, even if children survive the battlefield, former child
soldiers suffer irreparable harm from their involvement in armed
conflict.
77
B. A DARK DECADE: THE CIVIL WAR IN SIERRA LEONE
The conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991, when Liberian-
supported R.U.F. combatants entered Sierra Leone from Liberia in an
attempt to overthrow the Government of Sierra Leone.78 The
Government of Sierra Leone fought back by recruiting from among
the poor and disaffected youth of Sierra Leone. 79 Despite efforts to
76. See Children at War, supra note 8 (asserting that the physical and
psychological traumas that child soldiers experience often last well into
adulthood); see also AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 8, at 10 (underscoring that
children are particularly vulnerable to disease and malnutrition).
77. See Children at War, supra note 8 (noting that the rehabilitation needs of
children differ significantly from those of adults); supra notes 74-76 and
accompanying text (discussing how children suffer as a result of participation in
armed conflict).
78. See Fritz & Smith, supra note 6, at 394 (explaining how the R.U.F. easily
took control of the eastern region of Sierra Leone with the help of its chief ally,
Charles Taylor of Liberia). Taylorprovided the R.U.F. with troops and a model for
the RUF's'combat strategy. Id. From Taylor, the R.U.F. adopted the practices of
abducting children, sexually exploiting children, and amputating the limbs of their
enemies. Id.; see also Daniel J. Macaluso, Note, Absolute and Free Pardon. The
Effect of the Amnesty Provision in the Lom6 Peace Agreement on the Jurisdiction
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 347, 349 (2001)
(describing how the R.U.F. challenged the Sierra Leonean government); Lucinda
Saunders, Note, Rich and Rare are the Gems They War. Holding De Beers
Accountable for Trading Conflict Diamonds, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1402, 1422-
36 (2001) (noting that the R.U.F. never stated the political objectives of the
insurgency). There is speculation that control over the diamond mines in Sierra
Leone wag a driving force for the insurgency. Id. But see Background to Civil War,
supra note 1 (maintaining that the R.U.F., and not Charles Taylor, was the initial
impetus for the invasion). See generally Stephen Ellis, War in West Africa, 25
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 33 (2001) (contextualizing the conflict in Sierra Leone
with. respect to. conflicts in other West African countries and analyzing the
interrelationships between the conflicts).
79. See David Pratt, Sierra Leone. The Forgotten Crisis, Report to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, P.C., M.P. from David Pratt,
M.P.', Nepean-Carleton, Special Envoy to Sierra Leone (Apr. 23, 1999) (describing
how after the R.U.F. attacked, Sierra Leone President Momoh doubled the size of
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stop the R.U.F., however, the makeshift national army was ill-
equipped and unprepared for the attack; only months later, the R.U.F.
controlled more than one-fifth of the country.80 While the President
of Sierra Leone, Joseph Momoh, attempted to build a movement to
halt the increasingly powerful R.U.F., his attempts failed.8" Momoh's
reign ended in 1992, when he was ousted by a military coup lead by
Captain Valentine Strasser.8 2
Although the government and the R.U.F. briefly entered into a
cease-fire after Strasser's coup, shortly after, in late 1992, the R.U.F.
began to attack the economic targets of Sierra Leone's diamond rich
district of Kono.83 As the R.U.F. gained power, local troops began to
form militias in order to protect their citizens, further intensifying the
civil strife in Sierra Leone.84 As a result, in 1994, the Economic
Community of West African States Monitoring Group
("E.C.O.M.O.G.") sent troops in from Nigeria to defend the
his army from 3,000 to nearly 6,000 troops), available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/pratt042399.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2002). He obtained most of his
recruits from the vagrants of Freetown. Id. Momoh's foreign minister described the
recruits as the "rural ... unemployed, a fair number of hooligans, drug addicts, and
thieves." Id.
80. See Background to Civil War, supra note 1 (explaining how the Momoh
conscripted hundreds of recruits in order to launch a counter-offensive). However,
these recruits were poorly trained and often highly undisciplined. Id.; see also
Pratt, supra note 79 (noting that these troops were underpaid and demoralized).
81. See Background to Civil War, supra note 1 (reporting that the United
Libertarian Movement for Democracy consisted mostly of former supporters of
Liberia's President Sam Doe).
82. See Macaluso, supra note 78, at 349 (explaining that Strasser was deposed
in a coup by a military junta that succeeded in organizing the first multi-party
elections); see also Pratt, supra note 79 (reporting that Strasser was overthrown by
his deputy Brig. Julius Maada Bio); Karen Gallagher, Note, No Justice, No Peace:
The Legalities and Realities of Amnesty in Sierra Leone, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
149, 155 (noting the timeline of events in the conflict).
83. See Background to Civil War, supra note I (commenting on the
significance of control over the diamond regions of Sierra Leone).
84. See id. (discussing how four main groups, the Kamajors, Temne Kapra's,
Koranko Tamaboros, and the Kono Donsos, began to initiate their own protection
of the civilian population by forming civil defense forces).
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government.85 However, the foreign effort failed to defeat the rebel
forces, and the conflict continued.86
In February 1996, under U.N. supervision, the people of Sierra
Leone democratically elected Ahmend Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra
Leone People's Party as President. 7 Soon after the election, Kabbah
began negotiations with the R.U.F. that resulted in the Abijan
Accord,88 a peace agreement in which Kabbah agreed to grant
amnesty to the R.U.F. and other combatants, while the R.U.F. agreed
to an immediate cease-fire, disarmament, and demobilization.8 9 The
peace proved to be temporary, for in May 1997, the government
army faction Armed Forces Revolutionary Counsel ("A.F.R.C."), led
by General Johnny Paul Koroma, deposed Kabbah. 90
In 1998, E.C.O.M.O.G. troops drove the rebels from the capital
city, Freetown, and restored Kabbah to power.9 By late 1998,
however, the Sankoh-led R.U.F. controlled over half the country, and
85. See Pratt, supra note 79 (identifying E.C.O.M.O.G. as an intervention force
initiated by the Economic Community of West African States ("E.C.O.W.A.S.")
consisting of troops from Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana, and Gambia); see
also Fritz & Smith, supra note 6, at 395 (documenting the entrance of
E.C.O.M.O.G. into the "fray" in Sierra Leone in 1994).
86. See Macaluso, supra note 78, at 350 (discussing the failure of
E.C.O.M.O.G. to drive out the R.U.F.).
87. See id. at 349 (describing the R.U.F.'s refusal to recognize the election
results declaring Kabbah's victory); see also Sierra Leone News Archives, supra
note 1 (discussing Kabbah's victory in the post-war elections of May 2002 and the
various peacekeeping measures taken to ensure a peaceful election). U.N.
authorities congratulated Sierra Leone on the peacefulness of the elections and
called it a good sign for the re-building of Sierra Leone's government after the
decade-long civil war. Id.
88. Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Nov. 30, 1996, art. 1, available at
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierraleone_10301996.html (last visited Nov. 2,
2002).
89. See Diane Marie Amann, Message as a Medium in Sierra Leone, 7 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 239 (2001) (describing the terms of the Abijan Accord).
90. See Macaluso, supra note 78, at 350 (recounting the A.F.R.C.'s attack).
91. See id. (noting that the rebels had gained control of half of Sierra Leone
when E.C.O.M.O.G. forces drove the rebels out of Freetown and reinstated the
Kabbah-led government).
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by early 1999 the rebels had retaken Freetown.9 2 In May 1999, both
sides declared a cease-fire. 93  The R.U.F. and the government
negotiated the Lom& Peace Agreement,94 which offered amnesty to
all combatants and provided for R.U.F. inclusion in a new coalition
government in exchange for disarmament. 95 Nevertheless, Sankoh
and the R.U.F. failed to adhere to the terms of the Lom6 Peace
Agreement, and devastating human rights abuses continued. 96
In May 2000, R.U.F. rebels took several hundred U.N.
peacekeepers hostage, spurring the international community to take
92. See Steve Coll, The Other War: The Gratuitous Cruelties Against Civilians
in Sierra Leone Last Year Rivaled Those Committed in Kosovo at the Same Time,
WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2000, at W8 (reporting that commentators called the two
weeks during which the R.U.F. overtook Freetown "a war that was at that moment
the world's cruelest, as well as its most invisible"). Eventually, the E.C.O.M.O.G.
troops pushed the R.U.F. back, however, by this time approximately 6,000
civilians were dead, thousands were mutilated and limbless and an estimated 3,000
children had been abducted. Id.; see also Yvonne C. Lodico, The Justification for
Humanitarian Intervention: Will the Continent Matter?, 35 INT'L LAW. 1027,
1028-35 (2001) (arguing that the U.S. has developed a Somalia syndrome and is
extremely hesitant to intervene in African conflicts). While the attack on Freetown
killed as many people in a few days as the Serbs killed in one year in Kosovo, the
United States and the international community did not undertake a NATO-like
response. Id. at 1028.
93. See Amann, supra note 89, at 240 (reporting the cease-fire).
94. See Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, July 7, 1999 [hereinafter Lom6 Peace




95. See id. Part Two art. VII (appointing Foday Sankoh the Chairman of the
Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction
and Development). See generally Macaluso, supra note 78 (examining the effect of
the amnesty provision contained in the Lom6 Peace Agreement on the ability of
the Special Court to try those "most responsible" for violations of Sierra Leonean
criminal law).
96. See Macaluso, supra note 78, at 350 (illustrating the human rights abuses
which continued after the signing of the Lom6 Peace Agreement, particularly the
escalation of sexual violence); see also AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 8, at 1 (stating
that despite the signing of the Lom6 Peace Agreement, the recruitment and use of
children as combatants by both government-allied and rebel forces continued).
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action. 97 Thereafter, the capture and arrest of Foday Sankoh led to the
first discussions of an international criminal tribunal for Sierra
Leone. 98 In June 2000, the Sierra Leonean government requested that
the United Nations provide assistance in establishing a court to try
war criminals.99 The Government of Sierra Leone approved a draft
resolution that formally requested the Secretary-General set -up a
criminal tribunal and that the Security Counsel adopt the resolution
in August 2000.100
C. PICKING UP THE PIECES: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SPECIAL
COURT OF SIERRA LEONE
Humanitarian groups closely documented the countless human
rights abuses that children suffered at the hands of armed groups
throughout Sierra Leone's civil war.'0' These reports detail how the
R.U.F. forced abducted children to both witness and participate in
97. See Gallagher, supra note 82, at 167 (recounting that presumably, Foday
Sankoh ordered the R.U.F. to take the peacekeepers hostage).
98. See Macaluso, supra note 78, at 351 (explaining how Sierra Leone did not
believe that it had the legal resources to try war criminals and therefore wrote to
the United Nations to ask for assistance in establishing a criminal tribunal).
99. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 8, at 5 (stating that Sierra Leone sent a
letter to the United Nations requesting its help in establishing a war tribunal); see
also S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/1315
(2000) [hereinafter Resolution 1315] (initiating the development of a war tribunal
in Sierra Leone); Alison Smith, A Response to "A 'Special Court' for Sierra
Leone's War Crimes," GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, Aug. 15, 2001 (asserting that the
impetus for commencing negotiations on the Special Court was a letter sent by
President Kabbah to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Anan requesting assistance in
establishing a court), at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sierra/court/2001/critique.htm (last
visited Nov. 2, 2002). But see Michelle Sieff, A "Special Court" for Sierra
Leone's War Crimes, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, 2001 (claiming that the capture of
500 U.N. peacekeepers instigated the U.N.'s involvement in establishing a court in
Sierra Leone), at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sierra/court/200I /analysis.htm (last
visited Nov. 2, 2002).
100. See Smith, supra note 99 (describing Sierra Leone's acceptance of a draft
resolution).
101. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 8, at 4-7 (providing a detailed overview of
the human rights violations that the R.U.F. committed); see also Sexual Violence,
supra note 43 (documenting the human rights abuses that took place during the
civil war in Sierra Leone, specifically sexual violence).
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atrocities such as burning people alive, beheadings, amputations, and
mass rapes.10 2 The R.U.F., however, was not alone in committing
these war crimes;1°3 the Revolutionary Armed Forces ("R.A.F."),
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council ("A.F.R.C."), Civil Defense
Forces ("C.D.F."), and even the government's Sierra Leone Army
forcibly recruited children for participation in armed conflict.10 4
Due to the pervasiveness of the recruitment of children for armed
conflict, the Government of Sierra Leone faced enormous
prosecutorial challenges once it decided to establish a war crimes
tribunal. 05 Other obstacles, such as a dysfunctional legal system, also
hindered bringing perpetrators to justice."6 Indeed, the dire situation
in Sierra Leone mirrored that of Rwanda after the 1994 genocide. 07
Similar to Rwanda, the ten-year civil war decimated the justice
system in Sierra Leone. 08 The criminal and civil justice institutions
were barely functional, and Sierra Leone's national judicial
institutions lacked personnel with the training necessary to try those
accused of crimes under both national and international law. 109
After observing the seriousness of the situation in Sierra Leone, on
August 14, 2000, the U.N. Security Council took its first major step
toward the creation of a Special Court of Sierra Leone when it
102. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 8, at 4-7 (discussing extensively the
atrocities committed by the R.U.F.).
103. See Amnesty Press Release, supra note 3 (reporting that Amnesty
International delegates in Sierra Leone obtained graphic testimony from former
child combatants with the A.F.R.C., C.D.F., and the R.U.F.).
104. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 8, at 4-9 (documenting former child soldier
testimony from combatants fighting with the R.U.F., A.F.R.C., and C.D.F.).
105. See infra Part III (evaluating the challenges of attaining justice in Sierra
Leone through the Special Court).
106. See ENDING IMPUNITY, supra note 3, at 3 (reporting that the justice system
in Sierra Leone had collapsed during the prolonged conflict).
107. See Fritz & Smith, supra note 6, at 406 (commenting that the judicial
system of Rwanda was virtually destroyed during the genocide). Approximately
ninety-five percent of the country's lawyers and judges were killed, exiled, or
imprisoned. Id.
108. See ENDING IMPUNITY, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that almost all the courts
outside Freetown stopped functioning during the war).
109. See id. at 3-4 (stating that the necessary equipment and tools are not present
to conduct trials).
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unanimously passed Security Council Resolution 1315.110 The
Security Council proposed the Special Court as a hybrid court to be
jointly administered by the Sierra Leone Government and the United
Nations."' The unique structure of the Special Court related directly
to funding, because there was no political support for creating
another expensive international criminal tribunal like those
established in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. 2
After extensive negotiations on several contentious aspects of the
Special Court's statute, on January 16, 2002, Sierra Leone and the
United Nations agreed upon the Statute of the Special Court." 3
110. See Avril McDonald, Sierra Leone's Shoestring Special Court, 84 No. 845
INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 124, 124 (Mar. 2002) (explaining that the nine-
paragraph resolution assigned to the Secretary-General the task of negotiating with
the government of Sierra Leone an agreement to create an independent Special
Court); see also Smith, supra note 99 (indicating that the Resolution was the result
of a letter from President Kabbah to the United Nations requesting assistance in
establishing an international criminal court).
11. See Sieff, supra note 99 (noting that the Special Court of Sierra Leone is
neither a U.N. body similar to the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals nor a
domestic tribunal); see also Briefing Paper, Att'y Gen. of Ministry of Justice of
Sierra Leone, An Outreach and Special Education Program for the Special Court:
Recommendations of the Task Force to the Planning Mission for the Special Court
(Jan. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Briefing Paper], available at
http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/PlanningMission/BriefingPapers/Outreach.
html (last visited Nov. 2, 2002). The Briefing Paper proclaimed that the Special
Court's international criminal tribunal is aimed at
individual criminal liability, ending impunity, establishing facts around a
conflict generally and particular massive abuses specifically; the
establishment of individual responsibility for atrocities to overcome any
tendency for apportioning blame collectively; providing victims of crimes
with the opportunity to attain a sense of justice in their own individual cases;
and contributing to a meaningful process of reconciliation.
Id.
112. See McDonald, supra note 110, at 124 (explaining that Ralf Zacklin, U.N.
Assistant Under-Secretary General for Legal Affairs, stated that there was no
longer support on the Council for the creation of subsidiary legal bodies and that
the Security Council would not fund ad hoc tribunals other than had those in
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia).
113. See id. at 121 (explaining that the delays in reaching a final agreement were
mainly the result of insufficient funding for the Special Court). The Special Court
was not established by a Security Resolution like the tribunals in Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia, but rather was the result of an Agreement between the United
Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone. Id.
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While the scope of the Special Court's prosecution will be limited
due to the Statute's jurisdictional and financial restrictions, the
current state of the national judicial system in Sierra Leone demands
guidance and the restoration of credibility to judicial enforcement
there." 4 Whether those responsible for the conscription of children
into armed conflict will be brought to justice thus depends most
heavily on the Special's Court's ability to administer justice.1 5
II. ANALYSIS
The novel structure of the Special Court of Sierra Leone is a direct
response to the successes and failures of previous tribunals such as
the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia ("I.C.T.Y.") and
the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda ("I.C.T.R.").116 As a
result, the creation of the Special Court represents an innovative
attempt by the United Nations to establish a more efficient and
effective international criminal tribunal."7
114. See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text (expressing the
importance of Sierra Leone's mission to rebuild its judicial system).
115. See infra Part III (discussing the critical role the Special Court will play in
the peace-building process and in re-establishing a just and respected judicial
system in Sierra Leone).
116. See Fritz & Smith, supra note 6, at 405 (discussing that many of the major
criticisms of the I.C.T.Y. and I.C.T.R. were taken into consideration during the
drafting of the Statute of the Special Court); see also McDonald, supra note 110, at
122-124 (delineating the differences between the Special Court and previous
tribunals).
117. See Fritz & Smith, supra note 6, at 402 (suggesting that the more extensive
involvement Sierra Leone will be afforded in the administration of the Special
Court, as compared with the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda and the I.C.T.Y. and
I.C.T.R., appears to be a positive development). Furthermore,
The Special Court offers a promise of rebuilding Sierra Leone's society by
ending impunity but also offers a promise of rebuilding the society in a much
more tangible sense by generating institutional skills and resources crucial to
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While the United Nations was criticized for situating the I.C.T.R.
and I.C.T.Y. outside of Rwanda and Yugoslavia, the Special Court
will sit in Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone." 8
Because one objective of the Special Court is to help Sierra Leone
rebuild a strong national judicial system, the Court's establishment in
Sierra Leone is critical to its success."19 Since the judicial process
will be both visible and accessible to the people Of Sierra Leone, the
Special Court will have the potential to send the important message
that "international and domestic trials are complementary parts of an
integrated, holistic, and multifaceted approach to justice."'' 0
Notwithstandingthe benefits of the Special Court's location, many
structural and procedural inadequacies of the Special Court are likely
to hinder the Court's efforts to bring those responsible for the
recruitment of child soldiers to justice.'' Limitations on the Special
Court's jurisdiction, the United Nations' decision not to grant the
Special Court Chapter VII powers, the amnesty provision of the
Lom6 Peace Agreement, and substantial funding restraints will most
likely present significant obstacles to holding accountable all persons
responsible for the recruitment of children into armed conflict in
Sierra Leone. 2'
118. See id. at 405 (noting particular criticism by Neil Kritz of the United
Nations' decision to establish the I.C.T.R. outside of Rwanda because substantial
amounts of the population could not benefit from the media coverage of the trials).
119. See generally ENDING IMPUNITY, supra note 3, at 1-12 (stressing the
importance of holding those responsible for criminal acts accountable in order to
further post-conflict peace processes).
120. See Neil Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of
Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 132 (1996) (asserting a holistic approach to justice and
accountability).
121. See infra Part II and accompanying text (critiquing the weaknesses of the
Special Court and arguing that budgetary restraints, restricted jurisdiction, and the
lack of Chapter VII powers granted to the Special Court are likely to impede its
overall effectiveness).
122. See infra Part 1I and accompanying text (analyzing the inherent difficulties
created by the Special Court in terms of its ability to effectively hold accountable
those persons responsible for the recruitment of children into armed conflict).
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A. TEMPORAL AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Limitations placed on the Special Court's jurisdiction are likely to
prove prohibitive in prosecuting persons responsible for the
recruitment of child soldiers.1 23 Critically, the temporal jurisdiction
of the Special Court dates only from 1996, despite the fact that the
civil war began when the R.U.F. invaded Sierra Leone in 1991.124
This decision was mainly the result of U.N. precautions taken so that
the prosecutor of the Special Court would not be overburdened.2 5
While this may have been a practical decision regarding the internal
administration of the Special Court, when placed in the context of
Sierra Leone's ten-year civil war, many believe that the limited
temporal jurisdiction is both arbitrary and unfair.1 16
In particular, many Sierra Leoneans find the temporal jurisdiction
of the Special Court unjust because it focuses on atrocities
committed in and around Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, over
other provinces of Sierra Leone.'27 This is because the start date of
the Court's temporal jurisdiction, November 1996, corresponds
precisely with the time when Freetown first came under attack, while
123. See infra notes 124-125 and accompanying text (discussing the obstacles
produced by restricting the temporal jurisdiction of the Special Court to those
crimes committed after 1996).
124. See Fritz & Smith, supra note 6, at 410-11 (acknowledging that the
temporal jurisdiction start date of November 30, 1996 was the date of the first
comprehensive peace agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the
R.U.F.); see also Gallagher, supra note 82, at 156 (identifying this initial Peace
Agreement as the Abidjan Accord).
125. See Fritz & Smith, supra note 6, at 411 (suggesting that overloading the
Court was a concern, but also that it was intended that the start date of the Special
Court's jurisdiction should not appear to be politically motivated or biased).
126. See The Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone: Report of the
Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, Annex 1, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915, art. 1 (2000)
[hereinafter Special Court Report] (establishing November 1996 as the start date
for the temporal jurisdiction of the Special Court); see also Briefing Paper, supra
note 111 (discussing how individuals who do not live in the Western Province of
Sierra Leone, where Freetown is located and where the Special Court will sit,
believe that they are being overlooked and excluded from the political and judicial
processes). Because of the restricted temporal jurisdiction of the Special Court,
these individuals believe that justice is unlikely to be served on the perpetrators of
crimes committed prior to November 1996. Id.
127. See Briefing Paper, supra note 111 (noting that the November 1996 date
corresponds with the time when the capital first became a target of attack).
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most of the conflict prior to November 1996 took place outside
Freetown.'28 The ultimate consequence of the Special Court's
restrictive jurisdiction is that those responsible for the abduction and
forced recruitment of children before 1996 are unlikely to be held
accountable for their actions.'29 Indeed, five years of international
law violations by the R.U.F., A.F.R.C., C.D.R., and former Sierra
Leone Army will go unpunished because the perpetrators will not fall
under the Special Court's jurisdiction.'30
The Court's personal jurisdiction, which extends only to those
individuals who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations
of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed
in the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996, will further
limit the Court's prosecutorial potential.' By restricting personal
jurisdiction to those who bear the greatest responsibility, the Special
Court will not bring to justice all persons responsible for the
recruitment of child soldiers. 32  While the United Nations
recommended that jurisdiction be extended to "persons most
responsible" so that the Special Court would have more prosecutorial
power, the original phrasing has not been changed. 33 As a result, the
personal jurisdiction of the Special Court will only reach a very
small number of the many persons responsible for the atrocities
committed in Sierra Leone. 134
128. See generally Background to Civil War, supra note 1 (demonstrating how
the conflict did not reach Freetown until after the Abidjan Peace Accord).
129. See Special Court Report, supra note 126, annex art. 1 (detailing how
crimes prior to 1996 will not be prosecuted by the Special Court).
130. See infra notes 149-153 and accompanying text (explaining that it is
unlikely that these crimes will be prosecuted by Sierra Leone's national courts due
to the enforceability of the amnesty provision of the Lom6 Peace Agreement on
Sierra Leone's national courts).
131. See Special Court Report, supra note 126, annex art. 1 (outlining the ability
of the Court to prosecute only those persons "who bear the greatest responsibility
for the commission of crimes").
132. See id.
133. See Fritz & Smith, supra note 6, at 413 (stating that the language has been
retained in various drafts of the Statue in spite of the Secretary-General's
recommendation).
134. See Bruce Zagaris, UN Security Council Adopts Resolution on Protecting
Children During Armed Conflict, 18 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 203, 204 (2002)
(concluding that because the Special Court will be able to prosecute so few people,
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The Statute for the Special Court provides that persons who bear
the greatest responsibility include "those leaders who, in committing
such crimes, threatened the establishment of and implementation of
the peace process in Sierra Leone." '135 In Sierra Leone, not only the
highest-ranking leaders were responsible for serious human rights
abuses against children.'36 In fact, persons of all ranks in armed
groups and militias contributed to the atrocities.'37 Thus, by limiting
personal jurisdiction to the most notorious perpetrators, the Special
Court for Sierra Leone will never try many of the individuals guilty
of violations of international and domestic law.'38 Because the people
of Sierra Leone believe that all individuals guilty of crimes during
the war should be held accountable, this jurisdictional limitation is
likely to undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Special
Court. 139
B. CHAPTER VII POWERS
The United Nations' decision not to grant Chapter VII Security
Council powers to the Special Court of Sierra Leone presents another
challenge to holding individuals accountable for the recruitment of
child soldiers. 4 ° Chapter VII, Article 48 of the U.N. Charter
other measures are necessary to enforce international law concerning the protection
of the rights of children in armed conflict).
135. The Planning Mission on the Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, Attachment, art. 1, U.N.
Doc. S/2002/246 (2002) [hereinafter Planning Mission Report].
136. See generally AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 8, at 5-7 (stating that R.U.F.
soldiers and training officers beat children).
137. See, e.g., id. at 8 (reporting how one soldier beat Hassan, a child soldier
recruited at age thirteen, severely on the back and three weeks later scars were still
visible).
138. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text (providing examples of
how not all children are mistreated and recruited by "leaders").
139. See Macaluso, supra note 78, at 355 (stressing that the people of Sierra
Leone want to see more who are responsible punished for crimes committed during
the decade long conflict in Sierra Leone); see also supra note 134 and
accompanying text (indicating the small number of people who will actually be
prosecuted by the court).
140. See infra notes 143-147 and accompanying text (examining the
implications of the United Nations' decision not to grant the Special Court Chapter
VII powers).
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obligates all member state national courts to comply with Security
Council decisions, rather than just the national court of the state in
which the international tribunal is operating.' 4' Therefore, by
establishing the ad-hoc I.C.T.Y. and I.C.T.R. tribunals under Chapter
VII, these tribunals enjoyed primacy and concurrent jurisdiction with
respect to all national member courts. 142
In contrast, Sierra Leone Special Court's primacy is limited to the
national courts of Sierra Leone because the United Nations did not
grant the Special Court of Sierra Leone Chapter VII powers. 43 As a
result, other countries are not required to comply with the Special
Court's requests for evidence. 44 Crucially, the lack of Chapter VII
powers means that other states have no obligation to arrest an
accused individual who has fled Sierra Leone seeking safe harbor in
another state. 45
The failure of the United Nations to grant the Special Court
Chapter VII powers is likely to substantially inhibit the prosecution
of those responsible for the recruitment of child soldiers. 146 Many
R.U.F. commanding officers fled Sierra Leone to fight in Liberia,
and many more openly express their intention to leave Sierra Leone
before the Special Court becomes operational. 4 As a result, without
141. U.N. CHARTER art. 48 (stating the requirements of all member state
national courts). See Fritz & Smith, supra note 6, at 416 (interpreting Chapter VII,
Article 48 of the U.N. Charter).
142. See Fritz & Smith, supra note 6, at 416 (differentiating between the
I.C.T.R. and I.C.T.Y., which were granted Chapter VII powers, and the Special
Court, which was not granted Chapter VII powers).
143. See id. (stating that the ad hoc tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda do have
primacy and concurrent jurisdiction with respect to all national courts while the
Special Court of Sierra Leone does not).
144. See McDonald, supra note 110, at 125-26 (underscoring the limitations
placed on the power of the Special Court to demand compliance with evidence
requests due to the Special Court's lack of Chapter VII powers).
145. See id. (explicating how Chapter VII powers were indispensable for the
operation of the ad hoc tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda because
many indictees fled to other countries).
146. See infra note 147 and accompanying text (analyzing the ways in which the
Special Court's lack of Chapter VIl powers will inhibit the prosecution of those
responsible for the recruitment of child soldiers).
147. See Letter from Peter Takirambudde, Executive Director Africa Division,
Human Rights Watch, to Laila Stenseng, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of
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Chapter VII powers, it is likely that many of the leaders most
culpable for the systematic recruitment of child soldiers will escape
unscathed by Sierra Leone's Special Court.'48
C. AMNESTY PROVISION OF THE LOMIt PEACE AGREEMENT
The amnesty provision of the Lom6 Peace Agreement, the most
recent accord entered into by the Government of Sierra Leone and
the R.U.F., granted "free and absolute pardon" for all activities
undertaken in pursuit of the conflict in Sierra Leone.'49 At the time of
the signing of the Agreement, however, the United Nations stated
that this amnesty provision would not be applicable to genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, or other serious violations of
international humanitarian law. 5 ° Because the recruitment of child
soldiers is a violation of international humanitarian law, it was
encompassed by the United Nations' exception to the amnesty
provision."'
Norway to the U.N. (Mar. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Recommendations Letter]'(arguing
that the problem of indictees who have fled Sierra Leone needs to be addressed),
available at http://hrw.org/press/2002/03/sleoneO3O7-Itr.htm (last visited Nov. 2,
2002); see also Letter from Peter Takirambudde, Executive Director Africa
Division, Human Rights Watch, to Foreign and Justice Ministers of Burkina Faso,
Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya,
Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Togo, and Zambia (June 13, 2002)
[hereinafter Cooperation Letter] (reporting that members of the Human Rights
Watch staff in Sierra Leone have received credible information that certain Sierra
Leoneans who believe they may be indicted by the Special Court are developing
"exit strategies" to flee from Sierra Leone to other African states), available at
http://hrw.org/press/2002/06/sierraleone-africa-trO613.htm (last visited Nov. 2,
2002).
148. See id. (asserting that indictees will flee Sierra Leone in order to avoid
prosecution by the Special Court).
149. See Lom& Peace Agreement, supra note 94, art. IX(2) (providing a pardon
for conflict-related activities in Sierra Leone).
150. See Colum Lynch, Sierra Leone Seeds Aid on Tribunal, U.N. Weighs
Request on War Crimes, WASH. POST, June 16, 2000, at A24 (noting the argument
of the United Nations that the Agreement did not preclude international
adjudication of war crimes).
151. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 8, at 22-26 (explaining that recruitment
and use of children under the age of fifteen as combatants is prohibited by both
international human rights law and international humanitarian law); see also
Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, U.N. GAOR Supp.
No. 49, at 167, art. 38(2), U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) ("States Parties shall take all
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Nevertheless, the amnesty provision remains binding on crimes
committed under domestic law, prohibiting the Government of Sierra
Leone from prosecuting crimes committed from 1991 to 1999 under
Sidrra Leonean law.'52 Due to the Special Court's hybrid nature, the
amnesty provision will bar prosecution of violations of domestic law
in the Special Court prior to 1999, but will permit the prosecution of
violations of international law as early as 1996.1 3 In other words, the
Special Court has authority to prosecute all crimes under
international law after 1996, but the Court may only prosecute
crimes under Sierra Leone law committed after July 7, 1999.54
Since only the Special Court may prosecute persons responsible
for the recruitment of child soldiers prior to 1999, impunity will
persist for those who committed crimes before 1999 and who are not
prosecuted by the Special Court.'55 Furthermore, jurisdictional and
feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen
years do not take a direct part in hostilities."). This article further discusses age
restrictions for children in combat:
States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the
age of fifteen years into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons
who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age
of eighteen years, States Parties shall endeavor to give priority to those who
are the oldest.
Id.; see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 1125
U.N.T.S. 609, art. 4(3)(c) (1978) ("Children who have not attained the age of
fifteen shall neither be recruited in the armed forces of groups nor allowed to take
part in hostilities."); AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 8, at 24 n.l 1 (noting that Sierra
Leone acceded to the Geneva Convention on June 10, 1965 and acceded to both
the Additional Protocol I and II in October 1986).
152. See Lom6 Peace Agreement, supra note 94, art. IX(2) (outlining the
amnesty provision in the agreement).
153. See Macaluso, supra note 78, at 367-68 (commenting on the inconsistency
of the Statute of the Special Court). Macaluso argues that Article I cannot stand
because the Government of Sierra Leone granted "absolute and free pardon" to
Foday Sankoh and all combatants on July 7, 1999. Id.
154. See Lom6 Peace Agreement, supra note 94, art. IX(2) (granting "absolute
and free pardon" to all combatants for crimes committed prior to July 7, 1999).
155. See id. (discussing the types of individuals for whom impunity will not
hold).; see also No PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE, FAQ: What is the Special Court
Act?, Oct. 31, 2002 (explaining that while the amnesty provisions apply for crimes
under Sierra Leone law committed before July 7, 1999, they do not prevent people
from being prosecuted before the Special Court, for violations of international
law), at http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/FAQlmplLegn.htm (last visited
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financial constraints will limit the number of individuals tried by the
Special Court.'56 Consequently, most of those individuals responsible
for the recruitment of child soldiers will never be held accountable
by any judicial process since they will not be prosecuted by either the
Special Court or the national courts of Sierra Leone."5 7
D. FUNDING THE SPECIAL COURT OF SIERRA LEONE
The Special Court's budgetary restraints are also likely to
encumber the judicial process in Sierra Leone.'58 The U.N. Security
Council was unwilling to support another expensive criminal tribunal
and the Council refused to fund the Special Court as it had in the
I.C.T.Y. and I.C.T.R. 5 9 Instead, the United Nations decided to fund
the Special Court through voluntary contributions. 60 Unfortunately,
the Security Council did not make this decision because it was the
most appropriate approach to take, considering Sierra Leone's
circumstances, but because it was the only politically viable
Nov. 2, 2002). The amnesty provision, however, "continues to apply in Sierra
Leone courts and even the Special Court's Prosecutor can only prosecute crimes
under Sierra Leonean law committed after 7 July 1999." Id.
156. See supra notes 123-138 and accompanying text (outlining how the
personal and temporal jurisdiction of the Special Court will limit the number of
individuals prosecuted by the Special Court); see also infra notes 158-177 and
accompanying text (arguing that financial restrictions on the Special Court will
impede the Court's ability to prosecute more than a handful of persons).
157. See supra notes 152-154 and accompanying text (arguing that the Special
Court's statute unnecessarily hinders its objectives of bringing justice to the people
of Sierra Leone for the many crimes committed during the civil war).
158. See McDonald, supra note 110, at 142 (emphasizing that "cut-price and
shoddy attempts at international criminal justice run a huge risk not only of
discrediting the idea of justice itself but of further alienating the affected
populations.").
159. See id. at 124 n.6 (explaining that Ralph Zacklin, U.N. Assistant Under-
Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, indicated that there was no longer support in
the Security Council to establish subsidiary legal bodies, and that the U.N. Security
Council would not fund other ad hoc Tribunals as it had the I.C.T.Y. and I.C.T.R.).
160. See Resolution 1315, supra note 99 (requesting that the Secretary-General
submit recommendations on the "amount of voluntary contributions, as
appropriate, of funds, equipment and services to the special court, including
through the offer of expert personnel that may be needed from States,
intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations").
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option.' 6' As a result, the means provided to establish the Special
Court are unlikely to meet the ends sought by both Sierra Leone and
the United Nations. 62 While the Secretary-General's original budget
estimates for the Special Court were modest in comparison with the
Rwanda and Yugoslavia Tribunals, voluntary contributions failed to
meet those estimates. 63 Unwillingly, the Secretary-General was
forced to make even greater budget cuts, raising concerns about the
viability of the Court. 64 One concern is that the decision to fund the
operations of the Special Court through voluntary contributions
likely will impede the prosecution of those individuals responsible
for the recruitment of child soldiers.1 65
Because Sierra Leone only recently emerged from a decade-long
civil war, the country remains politically, socially, and economically
vulnerable. 66 This instability renders Sierra Leone particularly
161. See McDonald, supra note 110, at 124 (explaining that the Security
Council decided to create a sui generis Special Court because there was no support
for another expensive criminal tribunal and the Court could only be established
with support from Sierra Leone).
162. See infra notes 170-177 and accompanying text (arguing that the objectives
of the Special Court are unlikely to be met because of the Court's lack of resources
and personnel).
163. See McDonald, supra note 110, at 138 n.56 (citing estimates in a letter
dated July 12, 2001 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security
Counsel of $30.2 million for the first year and $84.4 million for the following two
years, defining the financial demands of Sierra Leone's Special Court as
comparatively small). Voluntary contributions as of July 6, 2001 were only $15
million. Id at 139; see also Fritz & Smith, supra note 6, at 420 (reporting that the
2001 awarded budget for the I.C.T.Y. was $108,487,700).
164. See McDonald, supra note 110, at 138 (recounting how the Secretary-
General's concern about the validity of a Special Court budgeted at such a reduced
level forced a meeting of Security Council members on June 1, 2001). At the
meeting, his message was that the Special Court would have to be a "bargain
basement" court, but at the same time would have to comply with the required
standards of due process and other human rights. Id. at 138-39.
165. See infra notes 166-182 and accompanying text (discussing the
implications of funding the Special Court through voluntary contributions).
166. See Chris McGreal, War Scarred Sierra Leone Votes for Peace, GUARDIAN
UNLIMITED, May 15, 2002 (demonstrating the instability of Sierra Leone by
reporting that 17,400 peace-keepers were employed in Sierra Leone to guard the
polls in the Presidential elections) , available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/sierra/article/0,2763,715608,00.html (last visited Nov.
2, 2002);.see also Sierra Leone: Jury Still Out, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, July 11,
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susceptible to improper influence by donor states. 67 By allowing
other states to make voluntary contributions, the Special Court's
independence may be jeopardized by significant contributions from
donor states. 68 Indeed, the risk that states will attempt to gain
political sway through substantial contributions to the Special Court
is especially great given the volatility of Sierra Leone's recent
political history. 169
Furthermore, the implementation of a voluntary contribution
funding system is likely to undermine the Special Court's
fundamental objectives of bringing justice to the victims of Sierra
Leone's civil war and restoring the national court system to a
legitimate and respected legal body. 70 Without sufficient financial
2002 (pointing out that peace remains fragile in Sierra Leone) , at
http://cgi.wn.com/?action=display&article= 14589735&template=sierraleone/index
search.txt& (last visited Nov. 2, 2002). Deep-rooted issues that gave rise to the
war, weak rule of law, crushing poverty, and inequitable distribution of natural
resources remain mostly un-addressed. Id.; see also Country Profile: Sierra Leone,
BBC NEWS, July 10, 2002 (stating that "[t]he problems of poverty, tribal rivalry
and official corruption that caused the war are far from over."), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/country-profiles/1061561.stm (last visited
Nov. 2, 2002). Indeed, the neighboring civil war in Liberia highlights the
instability of the region. Id.
167. See Recommendations Letter, supra note 147 (warning that the hybrid
nature of the Special Court creates challenges to maintain the Court's
independence from the Government of Sierra Leone). Additionally, the use of
voluntary contributions to fund the Special Court makes it "equally important to
ensure the Court's independence by donor states." Id.; see also Press Release,
Amnesty Int'l, Sierra Leone: The U.N. Security Council Must Make the Special
Court Effective and Viable (Feb. 13, 2001) ("The current Security Council
proposal for voluntary funding would not only undermine the Special Court's
effectiveness creating uncertainty, but may also undermine its independence."),
available at
http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/AFR510012001 ?OpenDocument&of=COUNT
RIES\SIERRA+LEONE (last visited Nov. 2, 2002).
168. See generally Recommendations Letter, supra note 147 (recommending
that there be close monitoring of the Special Court so that political incentives do
not compromise the Court's impartiality).
169. See supra Part I (illustrating the instability of Sierra Leone's political
leadership during the past decade as a result of continuous power struggles among
competing political groups).
170. See McDonald, supra note 110, at 142 (predicting that once the Special
Court becomes operational, it will become clear that it "cannot function on its
current budget and at its envisaged size ... [lest it] be remembered primarily for its
contribution to the regression of human rights").
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support from volunteering states, the Special Court will not be able
to retain the requisite personnel and monetary resources to
administer the Court effectively.' 7 1 This, in turn, will directly affect
the Special Court's ability to run fair and effective criminal trials. 7 2
The Special Court's lack of financial resources will also severely
limit the number of individuals the Court may prosecute. 73 Because
of the Special Court's financial restraints, it is improbable that the
Court will be able to prosecute all those who bear the greatest
responsibility for the atrocities in Sierra Leone.'74 Instead, the Court
will likely have to settle for the most notorious suspects. 75 Thus,
those responsible for the recruitment of child soldiers whom the
Prosecutor does not consider to be the most reprehensible of
171. See Letter from Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General, to the President of
the U.N. Security Council (Mar. 8, 2002) (reporting that the availability of
resources for the Special Court in Sierra Leone are either non-existent or extremely
scarce) , available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/letter/2002/246e.pdf (last visited
Oct. 19, 2002). In addition, the availability of evidentiary material was extremely
limited and substantial investigations would be needed to bring indictments. Id.;
see also Sierra Leone: Establish Special Court Quickly, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
Mar. 20, 2002 (quoting the Executive Director of the Africa Division of Human
Rights Watch as saying, "[flor the Special Court to be effective, U.N. member
states who have not contributed to the Special Court trust fund will have to step up
and pledge adequate funds."), at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/03/sleoneO320.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2002).
172. Cf Special Court Report, supra note 126, para. 70 (citing the Secretary-
General's argument that the risks associated with voluntary contributions are great
"in terms of both moral responsibility and loss of credibility of the Organization,
and its exposure to legal liability"). The Special Court "based on voluntary
contributions would be neither viable nor sustainable." Id.; see also Judy Aita,
U.N. to Begin Naming Sierra Leone War Crimes Court, Mar. 21, 2002 (reporting
that a twenty-person planning mission led by Hans Corell, Under Secretary-
General for Legal Affairs, traveled to Sierra Leone in January 2002), at
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/a203200l.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2002). The
planning mission found that most of the resources needed for the court's operation
were either "non-existent or extremely scarce" in Sierra Leone. Id.
173. See Cooperation Letter, supra note 147 (warning that the Special Court will
be able to prosecute very few individuals because of large budgetary restraints).
174. See Zagaris, supra note 134 (asserting that the Special Court of Sierra
Leone will probably only be able to prosecute less than twenty people).
175. See Special Court Report, supra note 126, annex art. 15 (providing that the
Prosecutor ultimately decides who will be prosecuted by the Special Court).
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criminals will not be prosecuted.176 These perpetrators will slip from
the Special Court's grasp not because of their innocence, but because
of the United Nations' inability to establish an effective funding
mechanism for Sierra Leone's Special Court.177
Finally, the Special Court's budget restraints will have a negative
impact on its legitimacy.178 Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, himself
argues that the risks associated with voluntary contributions are quite
significant "in terms of both moral responsibility and loss of
credibility of the Organization, and its exposure to liability," and that
the Special Court's financial basis of voluntary contributions is
"neither viable nor sustainable." 't79 The United Nations' struggle to
find states willing to fund the Special Court inhibits the Court's
prosecutorial agenda and delays its proceedings."' ° This struggle
sends the message that the international community is not as
committed to or interested in bringing justice to Sierra Leone. 8' In
176. See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text (explaining that only a
handful of individuals will be prosecuted by the Special Court, leaving many
culpable parties unpunished).
177. See supra notes 158-172 and accompanying text (demonstrating that
insufficient funds will prevent the Special Court from prosecuting all responsible
for the greatest violations of international and Sierra Leonean law).
178. See Special Court Report, supra note 126 para. 70 (alerting the
international community that funding the Special Court through voluntary
contributions could undermine the credibility of the Court).
179. See id. (noting Kofi Annan's arguments regarding voluntary contributions).
180. See McDonald, supra note 110, at 121 (attributing the continuous delays in
reaching a final agreement between Sierra Leone and the United Nations to the
difficulty in finding the money to establish the Special Court); see also Abbott,
supra note 22, at 418 (noting U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's comparison of
the Special Court and the other war crimes tribunals). Annan has stated:
While the Special Court differs from the two Tribunals in its nature and legal
status, the similarity in the kind of crimes committed, the temporal, territorial
and personal scope of jurisdiction, the number of accused, the organizational
structure of the Court and the Rules of the Procedure and Evidence suggest a
similar scope and duration of operation and a similar need for a viable and
sustainable financial mechanism.
Id. (emphasis added).
181. Cf Amann, supra note 89, at 239-45 (arguing that the message of the
amnesty provision of the Lom6 Peace Agreement is that the West does not care
and does not have the political will to do what really needs to be done in Sierra
Leone).
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order for those responsible for the recruitment of children in Sierra
Leone to be held legally accountable, it is critical that everyone
involved view the Special Court as a credible and legitimate legal
body. "'82 Without this legitimacy, witnesses and victims are unlikely
to come forward and tell their stories and, as a result, impunity will
persist.'83
III.RECOMMENDATIONS
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE SPECIAL COURT
To ensure that the Special Court prosecutes those responsible for
the recruitment of children into armed conflict, the U.N. Security
Council should endow the Special Court with Chapter VII powers. 84
Without Chapter VII powers, the Special Court will not succeed in
ending impunity for those individuals who systematically recruited
child soldiers because those who flee Sierra Leone may never face
prosecution.'85 Presently, the Special Court's inability to'reach many
of these individuals is likely to frustrate Sierra Leone's. efforts to
reinstate a legitimate and respected national legal system. 86
Alternatively, if the Security Council continues to refuse to endow
the Special Court with Chapter VII powers, the Council should adopt
a resolution mandating that states comply with the Special Court's
182. See ENDING IMPUNITY, supra note 3, at 2 (underscoring the importance of
the credibility and effectiveness ofjudicial process).
183. See Briefing Paper, supra note 11l (illustrating the negative effects of
international tribunals when information about their nature is widely unknown by
people, and suggesting that cooperative efforts to ensure clear and accurate
information dissemination are essential to formation and maintenance of a
legitimate Special Court).
184. See supra Part II (highlighting the major reasons why the U.N. should grant
the Special Court Chapter VII powers).
185. See id. (concluding that without Chapter VII powers, the Special Court will
be unable to prevent indictees from fleeing Sierra Leone and attaining safe harbor
in neighboring countries).
186. See Recommendations Letter, supra note 147 (describing how the
legitimacy of the Special Court may be questioned if the Special Court is not
granted Chapter VII powers).
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requests to surrender persons who are indicted by the Court.'87
Likewise, regional actors such as the Organization of African States
should exhibit their support of Sierra Leone's Special Court by
independently obligating member states to comply with such
requests.' 88 By requiring states to comply with requests by the
Special Court for evidence and persons, those individuals responsible
for the recruitment of child soldiers will not find safe havens outside
of Sierra Leone.' 89 Rather, they will be held accountable for their
actions in spite of their efforts to evade the jurisdiction of the Special
Court. 190
Establishing legitimacy for the Special Court will also be
contingent upon the Court's ability to hold perpetrators accountable
for their actions, regardless of their political positions or status. 191
Although the Special Court's Prosecutor must exhibit sensitivity to
Sierra Leone's political stability, it is critical to the future of the
Sierra Leonean judicial system that there be a credible and respected
prosecutorial procedure. 192 Continued monitoring by the United
Nations, in order to ensure that the prosecutor is acting
187. See id. (suggesting that a resolution requiring states to comply with the
Special Court's requests for evidence and persons would aid in increasing the
Court's efficiency and effectiveness).
188. See id. (proposing that the Organization of African States require member
states to assist in providing requested evidence and persons to the Special Court).
189. See id. (arguing that the aid of other states is necessary to ensure that
indictees will not escape prosecution by fleeing Sierra Leone).
190. See id. (predicting that with the cooperation of other states, individuals will
not be able to escape the jurisdiction of the Special Court).
191. See AMNESTY INT'L, Sierra Leone: An Independent Prosecution Policy
Must be Assured, Jan. 21, 2002 [hereinafter Independent Prosecution] (asserting
that in order to bring justice to Sierra Leone, a strong and independent prosecution
policy must be. adopted) , at
http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/print/AFR510012002?OpenDocument (last visited
Nov. 2, 2002).
192. See Chris McGreal, Unique Court to Try Killers of Sierra Leone,
GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Jan. 17, 2002 (arguing that the Special Court of Sierra
Leone is likely to face charges of selective justice if it does not prosecute the
leaders of groups other than the R.U.F. who are responsible for atrocities in Sierra
Leone) , at http://www.guardian.co.uk/sierra/article/0,2763,634697,00.html (last
visited Nov. 2, 2002).
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independently of political pressure, will be essential to bringing those
responsible for the recruitment of child soldiers to justice. 193
The Security Council should also approve an amendment to the
Statute of the Special Court extending temporal jurisdiction to
encompass the entire conflict in Sierra Leone.194 Currently, the
Special Court will not prosecute or investigate five years of war
crimes as a result of the November 1996 start date for the Special
Court's jurisdiction.'95 To the people of Sierra Leone, as well as
much of the international community, this date appears to be
arbitrary and unfair. 196 In order to rebuild the Sierra Leoneans'
confidence in the ability of the legal process to be just, it is necessary
to expand the jurisdiction of the Special Court to include the entire
conflict in Sierra Leone. 97 Otherwise, many individuals responsible
for the recruitment of child soldiers will never be prosecuted. 198
Finally, the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations
must work to publicize the administration of the Special Court. 199
The I.C.T.R. and I.C.T.Y. came under considerable attack because
the people of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia were not aware of
the tribunals' proceedings. 00 One way to disseminate information
about the Special Court would be to establish an Outreach and Public
193. See Independent Prosecution, supra note 191 (stating that the independence
of the Prosecutor from the United Nations and Sierra Leone must be established).
194. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 8, at 27 (recommending that the temporal
jurisdiction of the Special Court be extended to include all crimes committed
during the decade-long conflict in Sierra Leone).
195. See Special Court Report, supra note 126, stat. art. 1 (granting power to the
Special Court to persons "most responsible" for crimes committed since November
30, 1996).
196. See supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text (explaining the discontent
of the Sierra Leonean people over the November 1996 start date).
197. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 8, at 2 (emphasizing 'the importance of
international tribunals in bringing legitimacy to legal systems devastated by war).
198. See supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text (explaining that without
amending the Statute of the Special Court, all violations of international law
committed prior to 1996 will go unpunished).
199. See Briefing Paper, supra note 111 (stressing the importance of outreach
regarding the Special Court to the rehabilitation of Sierra Leone's people).
200. See id. sec. 2 (noting that with the exception of a relatively small portion of
the Yugoslav population, most of the affected people do not know of the existence
of the I.C.T.Y. and the I.C.T.R.).
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Education Program within the Special Court. 0' An Education
Program would assist in building credibility for the Special Court by
educating the people of Sierra Leone about the Court, its structure,
and its substantive law and internal procedures.2 °2
Through the development of a Public Outreach and Education
Program, the people of Sierra Leone would gain confidence in the
rule of law and its ability to bring justice to Sierra Leone.20 3 More
specifically, an education program would help children who were
victims of the conflict to come forward as witnesses and tell their
stories.20 4 Indeed, without the testimony of child soldiers, recruiters
will never be prosecuted, and justice will not be served.20 5
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
For the Special Court of Sierra Leone to succeed, it is imperative
that states increase their contributions to the funding of the Court.20 6
At present, the estimated budget for the Special Court is insufficient
to cover adequately the cost of bringing justice for crimes committed
during the civil war in Sierra Leone.20 7 Without more generous
201. See id. sec. 1 (proposing the establishment of an Outreach and Public
Education Program).
202. See id. sec. 3 (explaining that an education program is necessary due to the
misconceptions evident domestically in media coverage concerning the nature of
the Court).
203. See id. (illustrating how unchecked misconceptions could lead to
disillusionment with the Special Court). Ultimately, disillusionment with the
Special Court could undermine the legitimacy of the Court. Id.
204. Cf id. sec. 4.3 (observing that many ex-combatants need reassurance that
the vast majority of them will not be subject to prosecution before the Court).
205. Cf Briefing Paper, supra note 111, sec. 2 (describing how the I.C.T.Y. was
an extremely distant and misunderstood entity to the people of Bosnia). Few
understood the exact nature of the crimes for which people could be indicted by the
I.C.T.Y. Id. This problem appears to be repeating itself in Sierra Leone. Id. sec.
4.3.
206. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Funds Urged for Sierra Leone
Court (July 24, 2001) (noting that it is necessary for more states to pledge funds in
order to give the Court a solid footing), at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/07/uncourts0724.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2002).
207. See McDonald, supra note 110, at 138-39 (explaining that despite repeated
budget reductions, the Court has still not yet been provided with sufficient funds to
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contributions and support, the effectiveness of the Special Court's
unique structure is likely to collapse under financial restraints.2 8
While the funding accumulated thus far could support a handful of
trials, many of those perpetuating the use of child soldiers would
undoubtedly never see the courtroom.20 9 As the international
tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia demonstrate, the cost of justice
is quite high.210 However, those tribunals proved to be essential in
reestablishing peace and security."1
Additionally, countries must put the well-being of children ahead
of their own national agendas. 2  One step states should take is to
ratify the Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child in accordance with the Protocols' original policy requiring a
minimum age of eighteen before a child may be recruited by the
military. 3 By agreeing not to allow children under the age of
fulfill its mission). More funds must be found if the Court is not to be remembered
"primarily for its contribution to the regression of human rights". Id. at 142.
208. See supra notes 173-177 and accompanying text (arguing that the Special
Court will not be able to bring perpetrators to justice without a better foundation of
resources and support).
209. Cf McDonald, supra note 110, at 132 (stating that only a very select
handful of individuals will ever be prosecuted due the budgetary restraints of the
Special Court).
210. See id. at 139 (comparing Special Court to the I.C.T.Y. and I.C.T.R. and
commenting on the extremely high cost of running an international tribunal); cf
Smith, supra note 94 (arguing that the Court has the potential to address atrocities
and violations of international humanitarian law committed in Sierra Leone and is
therefore beneficial to the peace process).
211. See McDonald, supra note 110, at 122-23 (explaining the important 'ole
accountability plays in cleansing a nation and advancing the peace process).
212. Cf Becker Hearings, supra note 4 (arguing that the use of children in
combat is always unacceptable).
213. See Michel J. Dennis, Newly Adopted Protocols to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 789, 791 (2000) (discussing the benefits of
a minimum age of eighteen for military -recruitment); cf Becker Hearings, supra
note 4 (arguing that the United States should ratify the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child in order to provide international leadership
on the rights of children). Currently, the voluntary provision of the Optional
Protocol provides an escape hatch for state parties that want to recruit minors. See
Dennis, supra, at 790-91 (discussing the, fact that the Protocol on Children in
Armed Conflict allows seventeen year olds to be recruited by the military provided
that safeguards are taken to prevent their introduction to actual combat). By setting
the minimum age requirement at eighteen years old, this loophole would be
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eighteen into hostilities under any circumstance, states will be
showing a strong commitment toward protecting children's rights. 4
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE
In order to prevent the future use of child soldiers in Sierra Leone,
the Government of Sierra Leone must take several critical steps.
First, the Government of Sierra Leone should sign and ratify the
Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict
("Optional Protocol") adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on
May 25, 2000.215 The Optional Protocol raises the age for military
conscription from fifteen to eighteen years of age and requires state
parties to raise the age of voluntary recruitment to an age above the
former international standard of fifteen years.216 The Protocol also
sets the minimum age of voluntary recruitment at sixteen years old
and demands that states take "all feasible measures" to ensure that
eliminated. See id. at 790 (explaining that many states that rely on a voluntary
military objected to the prohibition of recruitment of children younger than
eighteen).
214. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (indicating the need to put the
well-being of children first).
215. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res, 54/263, U.N. GAOR, 54th
Sess., Annex I, Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (2000) [hereinafter Optional
Protocol]; see Dennis, supra note 213, at 789 (indicating that the United Nations
adopted the Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and the
Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Pornography ("Sale of
Children Protocol") on the same day). The Sale of Children' Protocol defines and
prohibits the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography. Id.; see
also Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Child Soldiers: Governments Agree to Ban Use
of Child Combatants but Treaty Fails to Prohibit all Recruitment of Under-18's
(Jan. 21, 2000) , at
http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/ndex/OR510022000?OpenDocument&of=-THEME
S/CHILDRENJUVENILES (last visited Nov. 2, 2002) (explaining that the
Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a child as anyone under the age of
eighteen but was adopted in 1989 with fifteen as the minimum age for recruitment
and use in hostilities). The draft of the Protocol addiesses this anomaly in
international legal children's rights standards. Id.
216. See Optional Protocol, supra note 215, arts. 1, 3 (providing the required age
limits).
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members of their armed forces under the age of eighteen do not take
a "direct part" in hostilities. 1 7
The ratification of the Optional Protocol will obligate the
Government of Sierra Leone to criminalize the recruitment of
children as child soldiers." 8 While Sierra Leone would be permitted
to continue to accept volunteers under the age of eighteen, several
safeguards would be mandatory before the child could enter the
armed forces.21 9 Finally, the Protocol would require Sierra Leone to
provide assistance for the rehabilitation and reintegration of former
child soldiers.22 By signing and ratifying the Optional Protocol the
Government of Sierra Leone would send a strong message to its
217. See id. art. 3(1) (requiring states parties to raise the minimum age for
voluntary recruitment of persons into their national armed forces above that
required by the Convention on the Rights of the child, which was fifteen). Article 1
requires states to "take all feasible measures to ensure" those under the age of
eighteen do not take a direct part in the hostilities. Id. art. 1; see also Dennis, supra
note 213, at 791 (underscoring that the language of the Optional Protocol is drawn
from Article 38(2) of the Convention of the Rights of the Child and Article 77(2)
of Geneva Protocol I, both of which require states parties to take all "feasible
measures" to ensure that children under the age of fifteen do not take a "direct part
in hostilities"). The term "feasible" has been understood in law of war treaties,
including Geneva Protocol I, to mean that which is "practicable or practically
possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time including military
and humanitarian considerations." Id. The term "[direct] participation in the
hostilities" has been understood in the context of treaties relating to the law of
armed conflict to mean a direct causal relationship between the activity engaged in
and the harm done to the enemy at the time and place where the activity takes
place. Id. at 792.
218. See Becker Hearings, supra note 4 (explaining that the Protocol requires
governments to criminalize the recruitment of children under eighteen or take other
appropriate measures to stop the practice).
219. See Optional Protocol, supra note 215, art. 3(3) (requiring State Parties that
permit voluntary recruitment into their national armed forces under the age of
eighteen to maintain, at minimum that (a) such recruitment is genuinely voluntary;
(b) such recruitment is carried out with the informed consent of the person's
parents or legal guardians; (c) such persons are fully informed of the duties
involved in such military services; (d) such persons provide reliable proof of age
prior to acceptance into national military service).
220. See id. art. 6(3) (obligating parties to take all feasible measures to ensure
that persons recruited or used in hostilities contrary to the present Protocol receive
appropriate assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and social
integration).
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people that it will no longer tolerate the recruitment of child
soldiers.221
Finally, the government of Sierra Leone should implement an
effective and universal birth registration system.222 In order to
prevent the use of child soldiers, it is imperative that Sierra Leone
ensure that all children are registered at birth and families receive
documentation of age.223 Without reliable age documentation,
families will continue to have no legal recourse against those
individuals who force their children into armed conflict.2 24 Without
adopting and enforcing a universal birth registration system,
ratification of the Optional Protocol will be useless because armed
groups will continue to argue that they believed that the children
were of age when they abducted them.225
CONCLUSION
The international legal community took great strides over the past
decade to protect children's rights more vigorously.226 International
Criminal Tribunals such as the I.C.T.Y., I.C.T.R., and Special Court
of Sierra Leone are prosecuting those responsible for human rights
221. See generally Amann, supra note 89 (emphasizing the importance of
sending a strong message to the people of Sierra Leone that those responsible for
war crimes will be held accountable). Because the amnesty provision of the Lom6
Peace Agreement sent the message that the international community did not care
about Sierra Leone, it is even more critical that the Special Court demonstrate that
the international community is dedicated to ensuring that justice is done in Sierra
Leone. Id. at 242.
222. See Hick, supra note 30, at 115 (proposing the establishment of a universal
birth recordation system to combat the use of children in armed conflict).
223. See id. (noting that failure to document the age of children makes it
difficult to prevent their recruitment as soldiers).
224. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (describing how recruiters are
able to evade age limitations on recruitment due to lack of documentation
regarding a child's age).
225. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (explaining that even
minimum age requirements are ineffective if there is no universal form of age
documentation and personal identification).
226. See supra Part I1 (acknowledging the creation of the I.C.T.Y., I.C.T.R., and
Special Court of Sierra Leone).
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abuses and war crimes against children.227 Further, legislation
implemented by the United Nations, such as the Optional Protocol,28
directly addresses the problem of children in armed conflict.2"9
Nonetheless, while these international efforts mark progress in the
fight for full protection of children's rights, major inadequacies still
exist, as evidenced by the Special Court's inability to address
adequately the realities of prosecuting those responsible for the
recruitment of child soldiers.230
Indeed, the majority of these deficiencies are the result of the
continuous failure to put the interests of children, particularly the
poorest and most vulnerable children, before national interests.'
This failure has occurred on both the state and international levels
and, as a result, a unified and comprehensive attack must be waged
to prohibit and punish the recruitment of child soldiers.2 32 The pursuit
of justice embodied by the Special Court of Sierra Leone presents a
chance for individual, state, and international actors to make a
statement with respect to the use of children in combat.2 33 By taking
critical steps to strengthen the Special Court's effectiveness in
prosecuting those responsible for the recruitment of child soldiers, it
is possible to send a powerful message to the international
227. See supra Part I (discussing the prosecutorial power of the Special Court
of Sierra Leone).
228. See supra notes 215-217 and accompanying text (introducing the Optional
Protocol).
229. See id. (specifying the international legal focus on the recruitment of child
soldiers).
230. See supra Part II (analyzing the deficiencies in the Special Court's structure
and critiquing the loopholes created by certain provisions in the Optional
Protocol).
231. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (demonstrating the failure of the
United Nations to put children's rights above political concerns).
232. See supra Part 11 (implicating Sierra Leone, the United Nations, and the
international community as contributors to the universal failure to adequately
address the problem of the recruitment of child soldiers).
233. See Amann, supra note 89, at 242 (arguing that the international
community has a chance to do better with respect to Sierra Leone and the Special
Court than it did when it played its role in the creation of the Lom& Peace
Agreement).
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community.2 34 Therefore, when Foday Sankoh faces the Special
Court and the war-ravaged children of Sierra Leone look on to see if
justice really exists, it is imperative that the United Nations, the
Government of Sierra Leone, and the international community show
the children that it does.235
234. See id. at 245 (asserting that by punishing those responsible for atrocities in
Sierra Leone, a message of accountability will be sent).
235. See supra Part I (emphasizing the importance of holding those like Foday
Sankoh accountable for their actions).
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